Overconfidence and Team Production: When Ignorance About the Biases of Others is Bliss* by Sandra Ludwig & Hanke Wickhorst
Overcondence and Team Production:
When Ignorance About the Biases of Others is Bliss*
Sandra Ludwigy
Dept. of Economics, LMU Munich
Philipp C. Wichardtz
Economic Theory 3, Dept. of Economics, University of Bonn
Hanke Wickhorstx
Dept. of Economics, University of M unster
This Version: February 13, 2009
Abstract. The present paper addresses the consequences of overcondence
within an intuitive model of team production taken from Gervais and Gold-
stein (2007). More specically, it adds to the discussion by Gervais and
Goldstein { who show that overcondence of one team member may increase
not only team productivity but also both agents' payos { in two ways. First,
regarding the value of information about biases, we show that it is always
optimal for an overcondent agent to be unaware of a potential bias of the
colleague. Moreover, we show that individual payos may still be higher in
a team of two overcondent agents than in a team of two rational ones irre-
spective of the agents' awareness of their colleagues' bias. Thus, our analysis
suggests that overcondence can indeed persist to a notable degree once it
emerges in a society of rational agents.
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muenster.de.1 Introduction
It is well-known that many individuals tend to overestimate their own skills.
This is conrmed by a broad eld of research especially in psychology (e.g.
Svenson, 1981; or Taylor and Brown, 1988). Moreover, several studies in-
dicate that managers in particular are prone to such biases (see Larwood
and Whittaker, 1977; or Weinstein, 1980). Analysing the economic eects
of such managerial overcondence, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2006), for
example, nd that managers undertake more welfare-reducing mergers and
investments as a result of the respective misconception of their ability. An-
other eect of overcondence is that individuals who overestimate their own
skill tend to work harder than individuals assessing their ability correctly
(see Felson, 1984; Locke and Latham, 1990; and Heath et al., 1999).
The economic consequences of overcondence, in particular of the eect
that overcondent agents tend to exert a higher eort (because they perceive
their marginal productivity as being higher), are addressed in a recent paper
by Gervais and Goldstein (2007). Analysing a model of team production with
eort complementarities, they show how overcondence reduces free-riding
and, thus, is benecial for the principal. Moreover, they show that when a
team consists of one overcondent and one rational agent, also the eort of
the rational agent (who is aware of his colleague's bias) increases due to the
eort complementarities. In particular, the higher eort of the biased agent
increases the marginal productivity of the rational agent. Consequently, the
rational agent increases his own eort, too. This increase in eort can give
rise to a Pareto-improvement in the sense that not only the principal and
the rational agent are better o but also the overcondent agent is better o
compared to a team of two rational agents: If the bias is moderate and/or
synergy eects are suciently large, the cost of the overcondent agent's
overinvestment in eort is more than compensated by the induced increase
in the rational agent's eort. Thus, although not the main focus of their
study, the analysis by Gervais and Goldstein indicates that overcondence
may be benecial not only for the principal but also for the (biased) agent.
In the present paper, we take up the idea that overcondence may lead
2to an Pareto-improvement and elaborate on the potential individual benets
from being overcondent. To begin with, we consider the question in how far
overcondent agents, who are obviously not aware of their own bias, would
benet from being aware of potential biases of others. As we will see, it is
always optimal for an overcondent agent to be unaware of the colleague's
bias. In a second step, we ask whether a team of two overcondent agents still
outperforms a fully rational team in terms of individual payos. In doing so,
we focus in particular on the individual optimal case where both agents are
unaware of their colleague's bias in order to see whether overcondence might
improve not only the principal's but also the agents' situation (recall that
team production with one or two overcondent agents is always higher than
in a fully rational team because of the agents' increased eort). Thus, while
the rst question asks for the individual optimal information status taking
overcondence as given, the second addresses the comparison between the
agents' payos with and without overcondence.
Studying individual payo eects in a team with two overcondent agents
is interesting because, if individual payos were higher also in the case with
two overcondent agents, this would give considerable support to a position
advocating the advantage of such a bias: We already know from the analysis
by Gervais and Goldstein that overcondence is benecial if the respective
agent is paired with a rational colleague; and, due to increased eorts, over-
condence is obviously benecial for the principal. In that sense, the ground
is already prepared for overcondence to emerge in a society of rational agents
{ at least to some degree. If on top of that individual payos in teams of two
overcondent agents were again higher than in teams of two rational agents,
this would render the prospects for the persistence of such a bias even better.
In particular, it would imply that { from the perspective of both the agents
and the principal { the worst that can happen is to have a team of two ra-
tional agents. Accordingly, it would substantially strengthen any argument
in favour of a widespread occurrence of overcondence.
In the remainder of this paper we rst show that being aware only of the
others' true abilities but not of their overcondence is indeed benecial for
an agent who is overcondent himself - despite the fact that being aware of
3the biases of others is closer to the true state of the world. The intuition
behind this result is rather straightforward. Due to the synergy eects, over-
condence of other team members increases the optimal eort level for any
agent who is aware of these biases. However, if an agent is overcondent
himself, his eort level is already above the individual optimum { because
of his own bias which he is unaware of. Awareness of the other team mem-
ber's bias, then, leads to a further (suboptimal) increase in his eort. By
contrast, lack of such awareness keeps the expectation about the colleague's
eort and, hence, the agent's extra eort, which he exerts in order to ex-
ploit eort complementarities, low. In combination with the increase in the
agent's eort due to his own overcondence this, however, brings the agent's
resulting eort choice closer to the overall individual optimum. In a sense,
all necessary upward-adjustments in the agent's eort (in order to exploit
the synergies from the colleague's overcondence) are already accounted for
in the agent's actual eort choice { although for a dierent reason, namely
the agent's own overcondence (which he is unaware of).
Based on this result, we then proceed to show that individual welfare in a
team with two overcondent agents is indeed higher than in a fully rational
team, provided that either synergy eects are suciently large or biases are
moderate. In fact, this result holds both for teams with two overcondent
agents in general and for teams with two overcondent agents who are both
unaware of each other's bias in particular. Again, the fact that individual
payos are also enhanced for a team with two overcondent agents who are
unaware of each other's bias is quite intuitive (all other cases follow a similar
reasoning). In particular, an overcondent agent 2 who is unaware of a
potential bias of his colleague, agent 1, exerts the same eort irrespective
of whether agent 1 is actually rational or overcondent. This is because by
assumption agent 2 is only aware of agent 1's ability and unaware of his
own bias. Yet, if agent 1 is rational, we already know that he exerts an
higher eort when he is paired with an overcondent agent 2 than when he
is paired with a rational one (as he anticipates agent 2's higher eort due to
agent 2's overcondence and exploits the synergies). If this additional eort
exerted by a rational agent 1, who is paired with an overcondent agent 2,
4suces to overcompensate the biased agent 2 for his extra eort, then the
additional eort exerted by a biased agent 1 (who exerts a higher eort only
because of his own overcondence but not because of his awareness of agent
2's bias) should have a similar eect on the payo of an overcondent agent
1. Consequently, compared to the fully rational case, overcondence in its
\individual optimal form" (i.e. combined with unawareness of the colleague's
bias) still provides a comparative advantage for both the team (due to the
agents' increased eorts) and the individual. Moreover, as long as biases are
small, even awareness of the other's bias will not obliterate these gains as
the additional cost from any extra eort exerted in order to complement the
colleague's bias is small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce
the baseline model proposed by Gervais and Goldstein (2007) and briey
review the results in case one agent is overcondent and one is rational. We
consider the dierent cases with two overcondent agents in Section 3. In
Section 4 we conclude. All proofs and technical derivations are gathered in
the Appendix.
2 Model and Review of First Results
This section is subdivided into two parts: First in Section 2.1, we introduce
the baseline model proposed by Gervais and Goldstein (2007), then, in Sec-
tion 2.2, we briey summarise their results for teams of one overcondent
and one rational agent.
2.1 The Baseline Model
Following Gervais and Goldstein (2007), we consider an all-equity rm which
is owned by risk neutral shareholders and requires the eort of two risk
neutral agents, i = 1;2, for production. Output generates from a single one-
period project, which can either succeed, with probability , or fail, with
probability 1   . The value of the project is the value of its expected cash
ow. The probability of success depends on the agents' unobservable eorts,
5ei 2 [0;1], their abilities, ai 2 [0;1], and a synergy eect. In particular,
 = aiei + a ie i + seie i; (1)
with ai + a i + s  1 so that success probabilities lie in [0;1], and s > 0
so that agents' eorts create positive externalities.1 The Agents' expected
abilities are equal and this is common knowledge; realised abilities are known
to the agent and his colleague but unknown to the principal. Eort is costly,
with the cost being c(ei) = 1
2e2
i. Since actual eort levels and abilities are
not observable for the principal, wages condition only on the outcome of the
project. Moreover, both agents are paid the same wage w: 0 < w  1,
in case the project is successful, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, agent i's
maximisation problem is
max
ei2[0;1]
w  (aiei + a ie i + seie i)  
1
2
e
2
i (2)
and equilibrium eorts are
e

i =
(ai + swa i)w
1   s2w2 ; i = 1;2: (3)
Note that the derived eorts lie indeed in [0;1] (cf. Appendix A.i). Moreover,
equilibrium eort levels are below the social optimum, because of the positive
externalities of eort which are not taken into account by the agents. Also,
as the agents' eorts are unobservable to the principal, rst best eort levels
cannot be implemented.
Finally, substituting the agents' equilibrium eorts into their payo func-
tions, we obtain
U

i =
w2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a i+swai)(1 s
2w
2)a i+(ai+swa i)
2]; i = 1;2: (4)
1The assumption of positive externalities, which follows Gervais and Goldstein, is e.g.
consistent with Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
62.2 A Rational Agent 1
Next, we briey recap the argument of Gervais and Goldstein (2007) for the
case that agent 2 is overcondent while agent 1 is still rational and aware
of agent 2's bias. Following Gervais and Goldstein, agent 2 is assumed to
overrate his own skill by b > 0, i.e. his perceived ability is a0
2 := a2 +b, with
a1 + a2 + s + b  1;2 and is not aware of his bias. Accordingly, substituting
agent 2's perceived ability into his maximisation problem, we obtain
max
e22[0;1]
w  (a1e1 + (a2 + b)e2 + se1e2)  
1
2
e
2
2 : (5)
By contrast, the maximisation problem of agent 1 is similar to the one from
the baseline model with a fully rational team. Yet, agent 1 now takes the
bias b of agent 2 into account; i.e. he knows that agent 2's eort reaction is
dierent and accounts for this in his maximisation problem. The resulting
equilibrium eorts are
^ e1 =
(a1 + (a2 + b)sw)w
1   s2w2 = e

1 +
bsw2
1   s2w2 ; (6)
^ e2 =
(a2 + b + a1sw)w
1   s2w2 = e

2 +
bw
1   s2w2 ; (7)
see Gervais and Goldstein (2007) for a derivation.3 Moreover, the agents'
individual equilibrium payos in this situation are
^ U1 = U

1 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a2 + swa1) + bs
2w
2] (8)
and
^ U2 = U

2 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a1 + swa2)sw   b(1   2s
2w
2)] :4 (9)
Obviously, compared to a situation without overcondence, b = 0, both
agents' eorts increase. This not only leads to a higher team productivity
(i.e. a higher rm value) and a higher expected payo of agent 1 (which is
2This assumption ensures that the success probabilities still lie in [0;1].
3Note again that these eort levels lie in [0;1] (cf. Appendix A.ii).
4See Appendix B.i for a derivation of the equilibrium payos.
7increasing in b). It also increases the expected payo of the overcondent
agent 2, provided either synergies are large or both the bias b and synergies
are suciently small, i.e. ^ U2 > U
2 if s  1 p
2w or if
b 
2(a1 + a2sw)sw
1   2s2w2 =: ^ b
c
2 and s <
1
p
2w
:5 (10)
Intuitively, the latter eect is due to the fact that agent 2 prots from the
positive externalities of the increased eort of agent 1. Even if these external-
ities are rather small, this outweighs the decrease in expected payo resulting
from agent 2's own increased eort as long as the extent of overcondence is
moderate.
3 Two Overcondent Agents
Extending the preceding analysis, we now turn to the discussion of teams
consisting of two overcondent agents. In particular, we subsequently ad-
dress (i) the individual optimal information status of an overcondent agent
regarding the (potential) overcondence of his colleague, and (ii) the com-
parison between individual payos in a team of two overcondent agents and
a team of two rational agents.
In doing so, we distinguish two main settings, namely a situation where
agent 1 is aware of agent 2's bias (Section 3.1) and one where he is not
(Section 3.2). In both settings, the focus of the analysis is on the question
whether agent 2 is better o by taking into account that agent 1 is overcon-
dent or not { given the type (rational or overcondent) of agent 1 and his
information about agent 2. As we will see, it is always better for agent 2 to
be unaware of the colleague's overcondence. The section concludes with the
remaining payo comparison between a fully rational and a fully overcon-
dent team and a brief summary of the main results (Section 3.3). Regarding
the payo comparison, we show that individual payos are higher in a team
5See Appendix D.i for a derivation. Gervais and Goldstein (2007) consider only under
which conditions expected payos are increasing in the bias, which holds for agent 2 if
b  1
2
^ bc
2.
8of two overcondent agents than those in a team of two rational agents under
fairly weak conditions.
For the sake of argument, we assume for all subsequent cases that the
agents' biases are identical, i.e. a00
1 := a1+b;a00
2 := a2+b with a1+a2+s+b < 1.
This assumption is not crucial, though, as agents take at most one bias
into account when determining their equilibrium eort. Yet, it ensures that
all subsequently derived comparative eects are solely due to the assumed
dierences in the information structure.
3.1 Two Overcondent Agents - Agent 1 Unaware
To begin with, we consider the situation where agent 1 is unaware of the bias
of agent 2. We distinguish two cases: First, agent 2 is also unaware of the
bias of agent 1 (Case 1), then, he is aware of it (Case 2).
Case 1: Agent 2 is unaware of agent 1's overcondence.
If both agents are overcondent but unaware of their colleague's bias, the
derivation of the maximisation problems and equilibrium eorts for both
agents is analogous to the derivation for agent 2 in the previous case, i.e.
when an overcondent agent 2 is paired with a rational agent 1, cf. Equations
(5) and (7). Accordingly, we obtain6
e
11
1 = e

1 +
bw
1   s2w2 ; (11)
e
11
2 = e

2 +
bw
1   s2w2 : (12)
Agent 2's decision is the same as before. Agent 1, however, now acts in the
same way as agent 2. This means, agent 1 increases his eort above the
individual rational level, i.e. above e
1, because of his own overcondence {
and no longer, as he did before, due to the knowledge of his colleague's bias.
Substituting equilibrium eorts into the agents' payo functions (com-
pare Appendix B.ii), we obtain the following equilibrium payos for this case
6That these eorts lie in [0;1] is shown by the argument given in Appendix A.ii.
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11
1 = U

1 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a2 + swa1)   b(1   2sw)] (13)
and
U
11
2 = U

2 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a1 + swa2)   b(1   2sw)] : (14)
Case 2: Agent 2 is aware of agent 1's overcondence.
In order to examine the eect of the agents' awareness of the colleague's
bias, we next consider the case in which agent 2 is aware of the bias of agent
1. Obviously, the maximisation problem and the corresponding equilibrium
eort of agent 1 remain the same as in Case 1. Yet, agent 2 now accounts
for the dierent reaction function of agent 1 (i.e. the increased eort due to
agent 1's bias) when maximising his payo. Thus, equilibrium eorts become
(cf. Appendix C for the derivation)
e
12
1 =
w(a1 + b + a2sw)
1   s2w2 = e

1 +
bw
1   s2w2 ; (15)
e
12
2 =
w(a2 + b + sw(a1 + b))
1   s2w2 = e

2 +
bw(1 + sw)
1   s2w2 : (16)
Note that in this case there are two reasons why agent 2 increases his
eort: (i) the biased perception of his own ability (he is not aware of), and
(ii) the awareness of the colleague's overcondence. Therefore, agent 2's
eort is not only higher than in the fully rational team (cf. Equation (3)),
but also higher than it is in case he is unaware of agent 1's bias. This implies
that the team's productivity rises compared to the fully rational team, the
team with only one overcondent agent, and the team with two overcondent
agents who are both unaware of their colleague's bias.
Substituting the agents' equilibrium eorts into the agents' payo func-
tions (the argument is analogous to the one given in Appendix B.i), we obtain
the following equilibrium payos
U
12
1 = U

1 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a2 +swa1)(1+sw) b(1 2sw(1+sw))] ; (17)
10U
12
2 = U

2 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a1 + swa2)   b(1   s
2w
2)] : (18)
Comparison of agent 2's payos in Case 1 and 2.
A simple payo comparison yields that if agent 1 is unaware of agent 2's bias,
agent 2 is better o being unaware of the bias of agent 1, i.e.
U
11
2 > U
12
2 ; (19)
as 0 < sw < 1. Intuitively, accounting for agent 1's overcondence induces
agent 2 to further increase his eort in an attempt to exploit eort comple-
mentarities. Yet, doing so is unfavourable for agent 2. His eort is already
above the individual optimum { because of his own overcondence { and the
further increase in eort is not complemented by agent 1. Thus, we conclude:
Lemma 1 If both agents are overcondent and agent 1 is unaware of the bias
of agent 2, then agent 2, ceteris paribus, is better o if he is also unaware of
agent 1's bias than if he is aware of it.
3.2 Two Overcondent Agents - Agent 1 Aware
Next, we turn to the analysis of the situation in which agent 1 is aware of
(and accounts for) the overcondence bias of agent 2. Again, we consider the
case that agent 2 is unaware and the case that he is aware of agent 1's bias
(Case 1 and 2, respectively).
Case 1: Agent 2 is unaware of agent 1's overcondence.
The case where both agents are overcondent but only agent 1 is aware of
the bias of agent 2, obviously, is analogous to Case 2 from Section 3.1, the
only dierence being that the information structure is reversed. Accordingly,
the resulting equilibrium eorts are
e
21
1 =
w(a1 + b + sw(a2 + b))
1   s2w2 = e

1 +
bw(1 + sw)
1   s2w2 ; (20)
11e
21
2 =
w(a2 + b + a1sw)
1   s2w2 = e

2 +
bw
1   s2w2 : (21)
Similarly, individual payos are
U
21
1 = U

1 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a2 + swa1)   b(1   s
2w
2)] (22)
and
U
21
2 = U

2 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a1 +swa2)(1+sw) b(1 2sw(1+sw))] ; (23)
the derivation is analogous to the argument given in Appendix B.i.
Case 2: Agent 2 is aware of agent 1's overcondence.
Finally, we turn to the case where both agents are overcondent and aware
of their colleague's bias. This situation is analogous to the situation of agent
1 in Case 1 where agent 1 is aware of agent 2's bias. Hence, for both agents,
equilibrium eort levels are determined accordingly and thus7
e
22
1 =
w[a1 + b + sw(a2 + b)]
1   s2w2 = e

1 +
bw(1 + sw)
1   s2w2 ; (24)
e
22
2 =
w[a2 + b + sw(a1 + b)]
1   s2w2 = e

2 +
bw(1 + sw)
1   s2w2 : (25)
Note that both agents now increase their eort for two reasons, namely be-
cause of their own overcondence as well as their attempt to complement the
other agent's increased eort.
The agents' resulting equilibrium payos for this scenario are
U
22
1 = U

1 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a2+swa1)(1+sw) b(1 2sw)(1+sw)
2] ; (26)
U
22
2 = U

2 +
bw2
2(1   s2w2)2[2(a1+swa2)(1+sw) b(1 2sw)(1+sw)
2] ; (27)
again the derivation is analogous to the argument given in Appendix B.i.
7Note that the derived eorts lie in [0;1] by the same argument as given in Appendix
C for e12
2 .
12Comparison of agent 2's payos in Case 1 and 2.
Straightforward calculations show that again agent 2 is better o being un-
aware of the bias of agent 1, i.e.
U
21
2 > U
22
2 ; (28)
see Appendix D.ii for a derivation. The intuition for this result is the same as
before. Complementing agent 1's additional eort is unfavourable for agent 2
because his eort is already higher than optimal { due to his own bias { and
because the further increase is not complemented by agent 1. Thus, similar
to the previous situation, we conclude the following.
Lemma 2 If both agents are overcondent and agent 1 is aware of the bias
of agent 2, then agent 2, ceteris paribus, is better o if he is unaware of agent
1's bias than if he is aware of it.
3.3 Comparison With Rational Team and Summary
The preceding analysis has shown that, if both agents of a team are over-
condent, each of them is better o not being aware of the bias of the other
one; cf. Lemma 1 and 2. Thus, given an agent is overcondent, it is al-
ways best for him to be unaware of a potential bias of his colleague. Yet,
the question remains how individual payos for a team of two overcondent
agents compare to those for a fully rational team. As the answer to this
question is interesting in view of a general comparison between rational and
overcondent agents, it shall be addressed in the sequel.
To begin with, we consider the case where both agents of the overcon-
dent team are unaware of their colleague's bias. Thus, in a sense, we ask
whether overcondence is benecial in its \individual optimal" form. Note
that, dierent from the case with one overcondent and one rational agent
which under certain conditions still was favourable even for the overcondent
agent, overcondence in this setting is not complemented by an increased ef-
fort of the respective colleague as all biases are unknown to the agents. Yet,
a comparison of individual payos reveals that, ceteris paribus, these are in-
13deed higher for an overcondent than for a fully rational team, i.e. U
i < U11
i ,
provided that either synergy eects are large, i.e. s  1
2w or synergy eects
and the biases also are moderate, i.e. s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
1 2sw ; see Ap-
pendix E.i for a formal derivation.
As already mentioned earlier, the above result in favour of overcondence
is rather intuitive given that under similar conditions both agents' payos are
higher in a team with one overcondent and one rational agent (cf. Section
2.2). In particular, the maximisation problem of the overcondent agent is
the same in both cases as he is only aware of the true ability of his colleague
and unaware of his own bias. Thus, he will exert the same eort in both
cases. Moreover, if the additional eort exerted by a rational agent 1 in
order to complement the extra amount of eort agent 2 exerts (due to his
overcondence) is enough to overcompensate agent 2 for this extra eort,
then it is natural to expect that also an overcondence bias of agent 1 has
a similar eect. Eventually, both the awareness of agent 2's bias and the
own overcondence of agent 1 have a similar eort-enhancing eect; and the
increased eort of agent 1 (due to his overcondence) is what compensates
agent 2 for his additional cost.
Completing our analysis, it is interesting to note that the favourable com-
parison of individual payos for an overcondent team with those for a fully
rational one does not depend on the overcondent agents' unawareness of
their colleagues' biases. In fact, also if both agents are aware of their col-
leagues' biases, individual payos are higher than in a fully rational team
if either synergy eects are large, i.e. s  1
2w, or if synergy eects and the
biases also are moderate, i.e. s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
(1 2sw)(1+sw) (cf. Appendix
E.ii). The constraints on the agents' biases now are stronger (as 1+sw > 1),
though, as both individual payos are lower than in the case where both
agents are unaware of the colleague's bias. Similarly, in the case with two
overcondent agents and one of whom being aware of the colleague's bias
while the other is not, individual payos are again higher than for a fully
rational team if either synergy eects are large or if synergy eects are small
but also biases are moderate. In this asymmetric situation, the agent who is
unaware of the other's bias has a comparative advantage within the team (at
14least if agents' abilities are suciently similar), though; see Appendix E.iii
for a formal argument.
Both above results are again rather natural given that overcondence
is individually benecial in case it is paired with unawareness of the other
agent's bias. Eventually, awareness of the colleague's bias \only" induces a
further increase in the agent's eort which is suboptimal in that the cost
exceeds the corresponding benet (because the agent's eort is already in-
creased due to his own overcondence). Yet, the cost eect of knowledge
about the colleague's bias is not necessarily detrimental to the agent (rela-
tive to the fully rational case): On the one hand, the cost eect is small if the
colleague's bias is small. On the other hand, the cost eect is at least smaller
than the benet from the colleague's excess eort (due to the colleague's
overcondence) if synergy eects are large. Thus, due to the continuity of
the payo functions, the respective increase in the agent's eort (resulting
from the additional knowledge about the colleague's bias) will not aect the
individual payo-ranking compared to the fully rational team if either of the
above mentioned conditions is satised.
Proposition 1 below summarises the main points of the preceding discus-
sion.
Proposition 1 For the above model of team production, in which agents'
eorts exhibit synergy eects concerning productivity, it holds that:
1. The individual payo of an overcondent agent whose colleague is also
overcondent is always higher if he is not aware of his colleague's bias
(irrespective of whether the colleague is aware of the agent's bias or
not).
2. Individual payos in a team of two overcondent agents who are both
unaware of the other's bias are higher than those in a team of two
rational agents provided that either synergy eects are large, s  1
2w, or
synergy eects and also biases are moderate, s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
1 2sw .
3. Individual payos in a team of two overcondent agents who are both
aware of the other's bias are higher than those in a team of two rational
15agents provided that either synergy eects are large, s  1
2w, or synergy
eects and also biases are moderate, s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
(1 2sw)(1+sw).
4. Individual payos in a team of two overcondent agents in which agent
1 is unaware of agent 2's bias while agent 2 is aware of agent 1's bias are
higher than those in a team of two rational agents provided that either
synergy eects are large, s  1
w, or synergy eects are intermediate
and the bias of agent 1 is moderate, i.e. 1
2w(
p
3   1)  s < 1
w and
b <
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
1 2sw(1+sw) , or synergy eects are small and also biases are
moderate, i.e. s < 1
2w(
p
3 1) and b < minf
2(a1+swa2)
1 s2w2 ;
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
1 2sw(1+sw) g.
4 Concluding Remarks
In the preceding sections, we have considered potential positive eects of
being overcondent within a model of team production with eort comple-
mentarities. In particular, the focus of the analysis has been on the individual
payo eects of awareness of others' biases once an agent himself is overcon-
dent.
As we have seen, a more rational perspective on others, i.e. awareness not
only of the others' true abilities but also of their overcondence, is suboptimal
for an agent who is overcondent. More specically, within the considered
model of team production, the payo of an overcondent agent 2, whose
colleague (agent 1) is also overcondent, is always higher if agent 2 is unaware
of agent 1's bias { irrespective of whether agent 1 is aware of agent 2's bias
or not.
Moreover, we compared individual payos for fully rational teams with
those for teams consisting of two overcondent agents (who are aware or
unaware of the bias of the colleague). According to our analysis, individual
payos in a team of two overcondent agents are higher than in a team of
two rational agents when either synergy eects are suciently large or biases
moderate.
As overcondence also enhances the individual payos of an agent whose
colleague is fully rational, the present analysis gives further support to the
16idea that being overcondent may indeed be advantageous not only for the
principal (as overcondence always enhances team productivity) but also for
the individual. Thus, we hope, our results will contribute to the understand-
ing of why overcondence is as widespread a phenomenon as empirical studies
indicate.
Appendix
A. Proof that eorts lie in [0;1].
(i) The derived eorts are positive as ai 2 [0;1], a i 2 [0;1],w 2 [0;1],
s > 0, and ai + a i + s  1 such that also 1 > sw. To see that
eorts are also smaller than one, dene m = maxfai;a ig. Then,
e
i 
m(1+sw)w
1 s2w2 = mw
1 sw. Using 1 > sw, mw
1 sw is smaller than one if
w(m + s)  1, which holds as ai + a i + s  1.
(ii) The eorts given in Equation (6) and (7) are positive as ai 2 [0;1],
a i 2 [0;1], w 2 [0;1], s > 0, b > 0, and ai + a i + s + b  1 such
that also 1 > sw. To see that eorts are also smaller than one, we
give an argument similar to the one in Appendix A.i: Dene ^ m =
maxfa1;a2 + bg. Then, ^ ei 
^ m(1+sw)w
1 s2w2 = ^ mw
1 sw. Using 1 > sw, ^ mw
1 sw is
smaller than one if w(^ m + s)  1, which holds as ai + a i + s + b  1.

B. Derivation of equilibrium payos.
(i) In order to derive the equilibrium payos, we substitute the respective
equilibrium eort levels given in Equations (6) and (7) into the indi-
vidual payo function Ui = w(aiei + a ie i + seie i)   1
2e2
i. Note here
that the bias only inuences equilibrium eorts but not directly enters
the payo.
(ii) In order to derive the equilibrium payos, we proceed as above by using
the equilibrium eort levels given in Equations (11) and (12).
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C. Derivation of equilibrium eorts with two overcondent agents
in Section 3.1 Case 2.
The eort of agent 1 is the same as the eort of agent 2 in the setting of
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) discussed in Section 2.2. Both agents are
overcondent and think their colleague is rational. However, in the current
setting, agent 2 exerts a dierent eort than agent 1 in the setting of Section
2.2. This is due to the fact that, although he takes into account the bias of
his colleague, he now is overcondent himself. Thus, his eort diers from
the eort of the rational agent 1 in Section 2.2. In particular, agent 2 chooses
his eort according to e2 = w(a2 +b+se1) where he takes into account that
agent 1 is overcondent (but thinks agent 2 is rational); i.e. agent 2 expects
agent 1 to react according to e1 = w(a1 + b + se2) where agent 1 expects
agent 2 to choose his eort according to e2 = w(a2 + se1). Substituting
e1 = w(a1 + b + se2) into the rst equation for agent 2's eort leads to the
following equilibrium eort levels of agent 1 and 2
e
12
1 =
w(a1 + b + a2sw)
1   s2w2 ;e
12
2 =
w(a2 + b + sw(a1 + b))
1   s2w2
as specied in Equations (15) and (16). Note that these eort lie indeed
in [0;1]: For e12
1 the argument is identical to the one given in Appendix
A.ii. For e12
2 the same argument applies, if instead of ^ m, we dene m12 =
maxfa1 + b;a2 + bg and substitute m12 for ^ m in Appendix A.ii.

D. Proof of the comparative individual payo eect for agent 2.
(i) Using the payo expressions given by Equations (4) and (9), we have
^ U2 > U
2 , bw2
2(1 s2w2)2[2(a1 + swa2)sw   b(1   2s2w2)] > 0. As b > 0
and w > 0, ^ U2 > U
2 holds if and only if 2(a1+swa2)sw > b(1 2s2w2).
If 1   2s2w2 > 0 , s < 1 p
2w the former condition is equivalent to
18b <
2(a1+swa2)sw
1 2s2w2 . If 1   2s2w2  0 , s  1 p
2w, then 2(a1 + swa2)sw >
b(1   2s2w2) holds as ai > 0 and sw > 0.
(ii) Using the payo expressions given by Equations (23) and (27), we have
U21
2 > U22
2 ,  b(1   2sw(1 + sw)) >  b(1   2sw)(1 + sw)2
, 2   sw   s2w2 > 0. This always holds true as sw < 1.

E. Proof of the comparative individual payo eect between the
fully rational team and the team with two overcondent agents
who are both unaware of the other's bias.
(i) Using the payo expressions given by Equations (4), (13) and (14)
respectively, we have U11
i > U
i , 2(a i + swai) > b(1   2sw).
This holds true if either s  1
2w or if s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
1 2sw .
(ii) Using the payo expressions given by Equations (4), (26) and (27)
respectively, we have U22
i > U
i , 2(a i +swai) > b(1 2sw)(1+sw).
This holds true if either s  1
2w or if s < 1
2w and b <
2(a i+swai)
(1 2sw)(1+sw).
(iii) Using the payo expressions given by Equations (4), (17) and (18)
respectively, we have for agent 1 who is unaware of agent 2's bias U12
1 >
U
1 , 2(a i + swai)(1 + sw) > b(1   2sw(1 + sw)).
This holds true if either 1   2sw(1 + sw)  0 , s2 + s 1
w   1
2w2  0
or if 1   2sw(1 + sw) < 0 and b <
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
(1 2sw(1+sw)) . Solving for s such
that s2 + s 1
w   1
2w2 = 0 yields s1;2 =   1
2w(1 
p
3). Since s has to be
positive, the only solution is s =   1
2w(1  
p
3). Since s2 + s 1
w   1
2w2 is
increasing in s for s >   1
2w and thus for all positive s, we have that
1 2sw(1+sw)  0 , s    1
2w(1 
p
3). Thus, U12
1 > U
1 holds true if
either s  1
2w(
p
3 1) or if s < 1
2w(
p
3 1) and b <
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
(1 2sw(1+sw)) . Note
that the threshold for b is weaker than in the case that both agents are
unaware of the colleagues' biases (and thus also if both agents are aware
of the biases) as
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
(1 2sw(1+sw)) >
2(a2+swa1)
1 2sw , 2sw(a2 + swa1) > 0.
19Similarly, we have for agent 2 who is aware of agent 1's bias that U12
2 >
U
2 , 2(a1 + swa2) > b(1   s2w2)). This holds true if either s  1
w or
if s < 1
w and b <
2(a1+swa2)
1 s2w2 . Note that now the threshold for the bias is
more strict than in case both agents are aware (and thus also if both
are unaware) of the colleague's bias as
2(a1+swa2)
1 s2w2 <
2(a1+swa2)
(1 2sw)(1+sw) ,
 sw(1 + sw) < 0. Hence, the payos of both agents are higher than
in the fully rational case if either synergy eects are large, s  1
w, or
synergy eects are intermediate and the bias of agent 1 is moderate,
i.e. 1
2w(
p
3   1)  s < 1
w and b <
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
1 2sw(1+sw) , or synergy eects
are small and also biases are moderate, i.e. s < 1
2w(
p
3   1) and b <
minf
2(a1+swa2)
1 s2w2 ;
2(a2+swa1)(1+sw)
1 2sw(1+sw) g. Note that for a1 = a2 this minimum
is given by the threshold for b derived for agent 2.
To see that agent 1 has a comparative advantage within the team, we
compare Equations (17) and (18) for a1 = a2 =: a. Then, U12
1 > U12
2 ,
2asw(1 + sw) >  bsw(2 + sw) which always holds. Thus, as long as
abilities are suciently similar, agent 1 is better o within the team.

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